Tag Archives: Nigeria

Former governors of Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Delta used Hacking Team products

Sahara Reporters has an article documenting additional Nigerian state governors who were spying on people using Hacking Team software. Previously we only knew that Bayelsa was using the technology.

The formers governors were of Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Delta.

“They claimed they were using it to track kidnappers,” officials at the office of the National Security Adviser said. “The governors claimed they were carrying out the operations with the SSS, but our investigations showed they were running it from their offices.” […]

A contractor from Akwa Ibom said Governor Akpabio refused to pay him for the project he executed for the state after he tapped his phone and overheard some critical comments he made about the former governor to some friends.

“He once boasted to me that he knew what I was doing and what I was saying about him,” the contractor said.


“Our targets are usually using the most advanced smart phones”: Hacking Team and Nigeria

In early July Hacking Team, an Italian hacking firm, was hacked. (Reply All episode on this here.) Interested to know if your government of interest was a client? You can do keyword searches of Hacking Team emails here.

Below: What I learned from searching “Nigeria,” before tiring on the 7th page of results.

The Bayelsa State Government was a client, contracting through two Israeli firms, NICE and V&V. Sahara Reporters has details here. One email describes the state government’s complaints with Hacking Team services: 1) the speed of 3G in Nigeria was making it difficult to use the hacking platform, and 2) the hacking software worked only on BlackBerry phones, but the VVIPs the government wanted to spy on preferred iPhones. What to do?

We are having a very problematic issue on the supported OS of the IPhone and Android, the new OS versions are not supported and in Nigeria our targets are usually using the most advanced Smart phones and the latest Android and Ios that our system is not supporting.

Many of the Nigeria emails relate to potential Nigerian government clients wanting a product demonstration before purchasing the hacking services, but Hacking Team had an internal company policy prohibiting its staff from going to Nigeria. Selling services to a Bangladeshi death squad? No problem. Let a Hacking Team account manager travel to Abuja? Too risky,

The army, National Security Advisor, and Chief Security Officer to the President were all — if not clients — potential clients.

Sam Igwe of Sahara Bells wrote to Hacking Team:

I can inform in strict confidentiality, under the terms of our NDA agreement, that our client is the President of Nigeria and the person we are dealing with directly is the Chief Security Officer to the President.

Adam Weinberg of NICE wrote to Hacking Team inquiring into pursuing the State Security Service as a potential client:

We have a new opportunity to offer RCS in Nigeria – the customer is SSS,  the local internal security organization. Please advise if we have a green light to proceed with those customers.

Perhaps the most surprising discovery, though, was that the government of Equatorial Guinea does not appear to be a client.


Crisis Group report on upcoming Nigerian elections

Last month’s International Crisis Group report is pessimistic about the prospect of free, fair, and peaceful elections for Nigeria in February. The report cites ominous statements from political and societal leaders who explicitly threaten violence in response to various possible outcomes.

I thought the part of the report on the politicization of the police and security services was the most interesting. I had not realized the extent to which the police and Department of State Services (aka SSS) have been systematically targeting pro-APC people. Here are some examples.

Recent police conduct, particularly in Rivers state, has raised concerns. Between May 2013 and early 2014, the federally-controlled police in the state (there is no state police) were criticised for alleged bias against the state governor, Amaechi, and his APC supporters. On 16 July 2013, police reportedly stood by as hundreds of anti-Amaechi thugs stoned the motorcade of four northern governors on a solidarity visit to the governor in Port Harcourt. The police were also accused of repeatedly turn- ing a blind eye when groups (including hired thugs and ex-militants) opposed to the governor and the APC paraded Port Harcourt, intimidated residents, while at the same time repeatedly providing protection to pro-PDP groups who attacked and disrupted APC events, including a 12 January 2014 rally in Port Harcourt, at which Senator Magnus Abe, a strong Amaechi ally, was reportedly hit with a rubber bullet.


Similarly, in January 2014, security operatives summoned and interrogated Nasir el-Rufai, an APC official who had warned that the 2015 elections may be followed by violence if the polls are not free and fair. In August, the DSS questioned Joseph Waku, an APC leader who had sharply criticised Jonathan. In contrast, when pro-Jonathan individuals similarly threaten mayhem if Jonathan is not re-elected or criticise opposition leaders provocatively, they are mostly ignored.


In Osun state, just hours before the polls, hooded security operatives arrested the APC’s national spokesman, Lai Mohammed; the media aide to the party’s national leader, Sunday Dare; the deputy chief of staff to Osun state Governor Afolabi Salisu; Osun state’s Agriculture Commissioner Wale Adedoyin; and 96 other party members. Most were freed without any charges once voting was concluded, but no PDP leaders or members were ever arrested.


Managing your Political Godfather

Managing your Political Godfather: Lessons in Conflict Dynamics from the Ngige-Uba Imbroglio by Chris Uwadoka is possibly the most interesting book I’ve read on Nigerian politics. (h/t to Jonathan.) Uwadoka tells the story of an infamous falling out between Dr. Chris Ngige (the godson) and Chief Chris Uba[h] (the godfather — godfather is the Nigerian word for patron) in Anambra state in the early 2000s, and then draws on analytical frameworks from a variety of disciplines to draw broader lessons about how future godsons and godfathers can best manage their relationship.


Uba selected Ngige as PDP nominee for governor of Anambra state. Uwadoka describes strategies Uba used to try to ensure Ngige would remain loyal once in office:

In picking [Ngige] forGovernor, Ubah considered his lack of charisma, political base and his perceived servile disposition to be a great advantage to him […]. Just to make assurance doubly sure, he arranged to have one of his elder sisters, Mrs. Eucharia Azodo, to emerge as the speaker of the Anambra State House of Assembly. This would make impeachment of Ngige easy if he became recalcitrant. Ubah also appointed another close loyalist […] who would take over from Ngige if the occasion arose. Then he reportedly took Ngige and other beneficiaries of his overnight political power base to the fearsome Okija Shrine and made them swear an oath of allegiance to him. He made Ngige sign a resignation letter in advance and to voice it into a recorder.

Uwadoka describes a strategy Uba used when trying to convince a reluctant Ngige to run for governor:

By putting Ngige away from other prospective and pretending godfathers, Uba may have been attempting to ensure that Ngige was left with no doubt as to who was buttering his bread. This is important because in the game of political jobbing, it is common for pretending godfathers to rush to a man whom they hear has been tipped for a political appointment and give him the impression that they are in the process of sponsoring him for that very position, whereas, in truth, they had no idea how the appointment came about.

In mid-2003, only one month into his term, Ngige’s relationship with Uba soured. I don’t completely understand what happened, but Uba attempted to formally remove him from office, and there was also a failed abduction attempt. Ngige hired his own security. In 2006 courts overturned his 2003 victory, and Ngige was replaced.

Uwadoka offers some “knockout questions for screening” for prospective godsons and godfathers. Here are my favorites

Knockout Questions for Screening Potential Godsons

  • Is he reasonably powerless without me?
  • Does he look like one that can live with the loss of some of his due privileges?

Knockout Questions for Screening Potential Godfathers

  • Can he muster the funds to bankroll me? (Should you be headhunted by a godfather and asked to be fielded for an elective position, ask for sufficient funds to be made available to you up-front. Many have been enticed out of employments and left to their own means.)
  • Can he offer protection? (If, for instance, my opponent hangs a murder accusation on my neck, how long will it take him to resolve the case by employing pressures from ‘above’?)

To further analyze godfather-godson relationships, Uwodoka brings in discussions of audience costs, the prisoner’s dilemma game, and credible commitments. It’s a really fun read, though I have no idea where one can find this book in the US.




Human Rights Watch report on Boko Haram violence

The new Human Rights Watch report on Boko Haram violence against civilians is devastating. Some excerpts:

On the increased abduction of women:

The increase in the number of abductions since mid-2013 appears to mark a change of strategy by Boko Haram. From 2009 through early 2013, the group did not appear to target women and girls specifically. Instead, it primarily launched assaults against those it considered part of an unjust and corrupt system: members of the security services, politicians, civil servants, and other symbols of authority. By early 2012 schools and students became increasingly targeted for attacks […] From 2009 to early 2013, according to Human Rights Watch’s research and monitoring of abuses, Boko Haram abducted individual women and girls from their homes or from the street during attacks on their communities. In most of the documented cases, married women were abducted as punishment for not supporting the group’s ideology, while unmarried women and girls were taken as brides after insurgents hastily offered a dowry to the families, who feared to resist. […]

Videos released by Boko Haram’s leaders in January and May 2013 suggest three key motives for the initial abductions: to retaliate against the government for its alleged detention of family members, including the wives of the group’s leaders; to punish students for attending Western schools; and to forcefully convert Christian women and girls to Islam. Some of the victims and analysts interviewed by Human Rights Watch have suggested women and girls are also being used for tactical reasons, such as to lure security forces to an ambush, force payment of a ransom, or for a prisoner exchange.

[…] Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, has [said] “Since you are now holding our women, (laughs) just wait and see what will happen to your own women … to your own wives according to Sharia law.”

Post-Chibok support seems to benefitting only former Chibok abductees, and even them not that much:

The federal and state funds, set up with support from international agencies and foreign governments in the wake of the high-profile Chibok abductions, have targeted the escaped Chibok girls but appear not to have widely benefitted the many other victims of Boko Haram abuses. […]

However, the young women and girls interviewed described the counseling received as religion-based; they said the Borno State government had arranged for pastors and Muslim clerics to speak with about 30 of them in a group at the Governor’s office. One girl described the counseling she received:

“We were all in a big hall, with many people that we did not know. It was when one of the speakers quoted from the Bible that I knew he was a pastor but I cannot remember what he said. As he finished his talk, the microphone was handed to a man dressed like a Muslim preacher, who also recited some Islamic words. Some other people also spoke. No one asked us any questions. I don’t think any of my school mates realized either that we were being counseled.”

I didn’t know all schools in Borno have been closed:

In March, federal government-run secondary schools in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states closed and their students were transferred to schools in other northern states, while all schools in Borno, the worst-hit of the states under emergency rule, have been closed since then.

On Chibok:

[…] the lack of security [at the Chibok school] made it easy for the fighters to overrun the compound, seize the young women and girls from their dormitory, and organize their transport. Boko Haram did not arrive with a sufficient number of vehicles, and tried to arrange for more. The students said they believed the primary objective of Boko Haram’s attack was the theft of a brick-making machine as well as food and other supplies. However, this apparently changed once the men realized they had access to the young women and girls and faced little resistance.

The relative ease with which it carried out the Chibok abductions appears to have emboldened Boko Haram to step up abductions elsewhere.

On motivations for abductions:

Other men appeared to have been targeted for abduction because of their specific skills or occupation, which filled a need in the insurgents’ camp. This was the case of a 46-year-old pharmaceutical salesman abducted from Buni Yadi in March 2014 while he sitting outside his shop with a group of friends. […]

A 19-year-old girl who was held in a Boko Haram camp in Gwoza told Human Rights Watch that she was offered thousands of naira as dowry to marry one of the insurgents:

“I refused the dowry, asking them to go pay to my father if they wanted to marry me. An insurgent who knows my family accepted it on my behalf. He told me he was afraid I would be killed if I continued to refuse. I became confused at the implication of being married to a Boko Haram member, so I pretended to be very ill, and the wedding was postponed until the return of the camp leader, who was travelling to meet the group’s overall leader in the Sambisa camp. He ordered that I should be taken to the hospital [in the local town] for tests before his return. It was the break I’d been praying for. I threatened the woman sent to take me to a hospital in town that I would scream and expose her to Civilian JTF. She quickly walked away as I made my escape.”

Insurgents later took revenge on her family for her escape, arresting her brother and burning her family home and the churches in her village.

On accountability:

[A 22 year old woman said] “I did not bother to report to security or police after my escape because they are aware that these abductions have been happening. And even when others had reported to them in the past, they did nothing.”


PDP-APC clashes in Port Harcourt

From Control Risks:

Clashes between supporters of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and All Progressives Congress (APC) party on 13 August in Port Harcourt (Rivers state) underline the credible risk of politically motivated unrest. Activists fired shots and threw stones and bottles during the disturbances, which began in the Rumuepirikom area and spread to other areas of the city, including Rumuokwuta and Rumuigbo. At least eight people were injured, several shops damaged and traffic disrupted in the affected areas. Riot police were deployed to quell the violence.

It is unclear what triggered the clashes. However, some reports indicate that the deposed traditional ruler of the Obio-Akpor local government area (LGA, Rivers) shot his son, who is a member of the PDP, and supporters of the party confronted APC activists who had gathered in Rumuepirikom to attend a meeting held by Governor Rotimi Amaechi as part of a tour of Rivers state that began in mid-July. The police arrested the former Obio-Akpor chief and several members of the APC.


Ekiti elections

Africa Confidential on the Ekiti elections, ungated at the moment:

The most obvious conclusion is that a well-financed and highly aggressive campaign with a bad policy record backed by state security will trump a decent policy record presented by less ruthless campaigners. […]

State security also intervened to stop Fayemi’s fellow governors […] from going to Ekiti on the eve of the poll. Under such security conditions, Lagos State Governor and opposition kingpin Babatunde Fashola questioned whether the vote was really free and fair as did northern activist Shehu Sani. Fayemi had conceded, they said, to avoid a bloody confrontation. […]

From the effort and finance that the PDP put into the Ekiti vote, it’s clear that its leaders are determined to break the opposition’s grip on the south-west. […]

Fayose’s team ran a textbook negative campaign – well funded and personally targeted.


“It’s not where you have the rich and mighty people doing their shopping.”

On the attacks on two markets in Jos, from the New York Times:

[Gad Peter, who works in the Jos office of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program, an activist group] was near the blast site on Tuesday. “It’s a business area, but it’s for the very poor,” he said. “There are women selling tomatoes. It’s not where you have the rich and mighty people doing their shopping,” he said.