I’ve just finished reading an article from the Journal of Modern African Studies called “US-Guinea relations during the rise and fall of Charles Taylor” (44.3, 2006, pages 415-439). The article is by Dane Smith, who served as US Ambassador to Guinea, Senegal, and then as Special Presidential Envoy for Liberia, throughout the 1990s. (I have uploaded this article to the Liberia Expats Google Group. If you are not a member, and would like to join, email me.)
For anyone who doesn’t feel like they have a strong grasp of the various roles Guinea played in Liberia’s war (and I put myself in that category), this article is a good supplement to the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch reports that have been written on the subject.
I wish Smith offered a bit more analysis to enliven the storytelling, but the article is still a quick read, and very useful. There is a particularly good section describing Lansana Conte, the president of Guinea from 1984 until his death at the end of last year:
He views himself as a soldier and farmer, close to the land and most comfortable at his farm in Dubreka. He is a private person, a man of plain tastes who does not put on airs and does not need international approbation. By the standards of autocratic African leaders, Conte is not acquisitive and greedy. Although there may have been “joint ventures” with some foreign investors, there are few stories in Guinea or elsewhere about Swiss bank accounts and overseas assets. He is blunt rather than diplomatic. He is naturally cautious, a trait doubtless reinforced by the struggle for survival under Sekou Toure. He does not rush into decisions, but through general shrewdness has avoided major mistakes. Conte has limited foreign policy interests…He travels infrequently and has skipped many African summit meetings.
Some highlights from the article are below. I copy some language directly from the text:
- Throughout the war in Liberia, Conte thought Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Charles Taylor were bent on installing a government in Guinea–and elsewhere–that was beholden to them.
- Most Francophone West African countries were pro-Taylor. But Conte related to Samuel Doe, as they both gained power by military means and then claimed legitimacy through not-so-fair elections.
- ULIMO was launched in Conakry. There were reports that Guinea was helping to train ULIMO fighters during the 1990s. Conte claimed that Guinea was training Liberians on the request of then-interim president of Liberia Amos Sawyer, and that these Liberians would be the seeds for a new Liberian army. The training camp commander, however, declined to let a US defense attaché observe the camp.
- The wife of the head of LURD was Guinean, and had special influence with Conte.
- In 2000 RUF troops and Taylor fighters attacked a town in Guinea near the Liberian border. Conte responded by detaining thousands of refugees, who he accused of being combatants. While some of those in the refugee camps were combatants, most weren’t. After this attack, Guinea expanded support for LURD. When Taylor left Liberia for Nigeria at the end of 2003, Conte’s main objective was achieved, and he quickly terminated assistance to LURD.

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