Army reform going well, police reform less impressive

Below are the facts and ideas I found most interesting from the latest International Crisis Group report on Liberia called “Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform.” This is not an overview of the report; if that’s what you’re looking for, read the report’s executive summary.

Like all Crisis Group reports on Liberia, this one is fantastic. My only complaint is that they should write about the country more than once every two years.

At some points below I copy directly from the report’s text.

• Bottom line: Army reform—particularly the vetting process—has been a provisional success, despite a lack of oversight of private military companies (PMCs) and consensus on strategic objectives. Police reform has been less impressive. A clear plan for fighting possible future insurgencies is lacking.
• My favorite report recommendation: Make bidding for security-related contracts as transparent as the US has required Liberia to be via the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program.
• Oversight of PMCs is important because foreign military trainers have been involved in Liberia throughout its history, often exacerbating conflict.
• In disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes in other countries, recruitment into the new army is used to absorb ex-combatants. This is not what happened in Liberia, and it has led to high levels of unemployment and frustration among ex-fighters.
• Many expatriates and some Liberians describe the continuing existence of rebel group command and control structures as a problem. Villagers offer a more mixed view. In most provincial towns, civilians live peacefully beside young ex-combatants and use their services. The former fighters in those towns drive motorcycle taxis. In more rural areas they form economic units for rubber tapping and artisanal diamond and gold mining. Continuing contact and relative lawlessness might contribute to reactivation of ex-combatant units in Liberia or a neighboring country, but that is not the likeliest scenario. Their entrenchment in local economies may also be a key factor in the choice not to engage in further armed violence.
• Liberians hope that if an insurgency overwhelmed UNMIL or emerged after the peacekeepers left, the US would quash it. If history is a guide, however, an expectation that the US would come to Liberia’s rescue is misplaced.
• There are some reports that the recent spike in robberies might be part of a coordinated attempt to destabilize the government. Some have seen truckloads of young men transported from Kakata to Monrovia.
• Violent conflicts over land in Liberia are a symptom, not the cause, of a variety of disputes. Many say ethnic conflict is the cause of land conflict, but often this is not the case. In Nimba, where perceptions of ethnic conflict are most pronounced, the largest number of land disputes are between ethnic Mano.

Army Reform

• Army reform has been a success largely due to individual goodwill and hard work in spite of, rather than because of, the structures in place.
• Dyn Corp and PAE have a 5-year monopoly contract for all State Department security-related services in Africa to help streamline bidding. But often these companies subcontract. This is inefficient.
• The military professionals involved in training the new forces often preferred to treat SSR as a technical and logistical challenge, rather than a social and political one.
• Army recruitment could be bolstered and the diversity of candidates improved by removing unnecessary physical criteria for administrative jobs.
• Two security sector reform (SSR) experts called the army vetting process that took place in Liberia the best vetting process they had seen anywhere in the world.

Police reform

• Unlike the “root and branch” attempt to re-build the army from the ground up, police reform has been built upon existing personnel.
• Some have said not enough corrupt officials were eliminated originally, while others say UNMIL has been too mistrustful of the old hierarchy and had removed too many.
• Reports by the UN Secretary-General and others consistently have concluded that the justice sector has made less progress than almost any other.
• Crisis Group argues that the new law making the death penalty a possible punishment for armed robbery, and making armed robbery a non-bailable offense, should help with the security situation. I disagree that the death penalty will help with this. In a country where vigilante justice often leads to murder, I don’t think it’s a good idea for a law to sanction killing. If anything, it could encourage mob killings by condoning death as a punishment.

Ex-combatant reintegration and SSR

• Both UNMIL and fighters had reason to maximize the numbers on the DDR rolls. Former fighters saw DDR as yet another rent to be exploited. UNMIL wanted to increase participation of women and war-affected youths in DDR, so women and anyone under 18 could enter the program without turning over weapons or ammunition.
• The easy demobilization money reinforced ex-combatants views that the threat or use of violence was a viable way to make a living.

Prviate companies in SSR

• A fundamental question in Liberia’s SSR process is whether democratic institutions responsive to civilian oversight can be built by private contractors and in an atmosphere of at least partial secrecy.
• If the US military had trained the Liberian army, the incentives would have been much stronger for them to stay engaged in mentoring and exchanges to ensure the long-term success of the mission and their own institution’s reputation. PMCs can be attractive because they are less “on the hook” for the outcome.